Comaptible

I came across this explanation of compatibilism - the notion that free will and determinism are compatible - written by D.D. Raphael in his book "Moral Philosophy".(If it seems like I obsess a little over this, it's probably because I do!)

Quote:

According to the compatibility thesis, determinism must be accepted because it is certainly true that every event has a cause. On the other hand, the idea of freedom must also be accepted because there is a valid distinction between action which is free or voluntary and action which is compelled or involuntary. The two views are compatible, however, it is alleged, because the distinction between the voluntary and involuntary is not a distinction between the uncaused and caused. All actions are caused, but some have internal causes and others have external causes. If you stay in your study because you want to do so, you stay of your own free will; you act voluntarily. If you stay in the study because somebody has locked the door and taken away the key, you stay under compulsion; you act involuntarily. That is a perfectly proper distinction. But it does not affect the truth of the statement that that in either case your action has a cause. When you remain voluntarily, the cause is your own desire to remain. When you remain involuntarily, the cause is the limitation placed on your movements by the locked door. When the cause is internal, a desire of the agent, we say he acts voluntarily, of his own free will or wish. When the cause is external and happens to clash with what the agent wants to do, we say he acts involuntarily or is compelled. It is perfectly possible to act voluntarily and yet from a necessitating cause. The proper distinction to be drawn, according to this account, is a distinction between freedom and compulsion, not from freedom and necessity.

Raphael then goes on to say how this does not satisfy those who believe that humans have complete freedom of action and choice, freedom above and beyond what other animals experience (he calls these libertarians). Afterall, a dog also remains in a room either voluntarily or involuntarily; of her own desire, or by compulsion. Libertarians believe we have freedom of action and freedom of choice - something most will not grant other animals - but even by the compatibility thesis this is denied, it says we only have freedom of action.

I'll go a bit further and give Raphael's opinion on the whole debate:

What are the reasons why some people accept determinism in the first place? There are 4 steps to the logic:
1) Every event has a cause 2) This implies that every event is necessitated 3) Actions are a species of events 4) Therefore every action is necessitated.

It all hinges on step two - is it true that if an event has a cause then that event happens by necessity? In the physical sciences this appears to be true; there are universal laws. But can this be said in the social sciences? What you will find is that there are no such universal laws with regards to human behaviour. In order for there to be a necessary connection you would have to observe the same outcome every single time you observe a particular cause. However, you could tell someone who just received a Christmas bonus that according to Keynes's law they will not increase their spending in proportion to their increase in pay. That person could then decide to refute that law by blowing the bonus in one night. Apparently, Keynes's law does not describe a necessity.

It may be said that a deliberate decision to refute a law of behaviour is not really an exception to the law because a further causal factor has been introduced, namely the desire to refute the original law; the action that now takes place will fall under a different, more complex, law which take account of such a desire. But this objection begs the question and misses the point....The argument is that whatever generalization is put forward as a universal regularity can (usually) be shown to lack universality. 

The social sciences describe tendencies not universal regularities. He concludes:

Choice can make habit, choice can break habit, and choice can follow out a consistent plan. The result is regularity of behaviour, in which choice plays a causal role, but there is no reason to say that it involves necessity.

But, don't choices also have causes? Yes, but these causes produce tendencies not necessities.

Yet another opinion to add to the muddy waters!

I couldn't have said it any better myself, Muddy