Hume - Of Morals

This is the final book of Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, looking at the nature of morality

Of Reason

 

One theme that is present through all of Hume's writing is that every action of the mind can be understood as a perception. This is no less true of those judgements by which we distinguish between moral good and evil. When we think of something as being morally wrong, we perceive it as being wrong. This is slightly different than saying, as many believe, that moral truths can be discovered through the use of reason alone. Would it be possible, given a moral dilemma, to find out through reason what is absolutely the right thing to do? As an example, I'll use the dilemma that a student presented to Jean Paul Sartre, the French existentialist: The young man was torn between going to fight against the Nazi occupation of France during world war II and staying at home with his widowed mother. I think we can tell that there is no "right" answer to this problem; that both decisions are blameless and depend only on which desire was strongest within the student - the desire to fight for a worthy cause, or the desire to support his mother. No doubt he thought a great deal about it, and was able to justify his decision with reason, but ultimately it was his desire that tipped the scale; his desire guided his reason.

When we use reason to discover a truth or falsehood we are looking for either a real relation of ideas or matters of fact. Anything that is not applicable to these is not an object of reason; and this includes our passions, volition, and actions - these are complete facts in themselves. What relation of ideas or facts would lead someone to say that love or volition or the act of taking out the garbage are truths or falsehoods in themselves? (They can become a matter of reason if you make a statement such as "Bob took the garbage out yesterday", but Bob himself waking up and taking out the garbage is not a truth or falsehood.) Hume says that this "proves directly, that actions do not derive their merit from a conformity to reason, nor their blame from a contrariety to it."

Since we know that morals influence our passions and actions and reason does not, reason cannot be the sole source of moral good and evil.

Vice and virtue

Is it possible to say that some actions are certainly always virtuous or always from vice (i.e. vicious)? That is, the actions themselves. By now you could probably guess Hume's answer: no. To illustrate this Hume uses a very interesting example. Consider an oak sapling that grows up, overwhelms, and destroys its parent. Is this patricide? Is this an immoral act? The external relations between the oak destroying its parent and a human son destroying his parents are the same, but one is attended with a sense of unease while the other is not; so, when it comes to these relations, "as their discovery is not in both cases attended with a notion of immorality, it follows, that the notion does not arise from such a discovery." That is, it is not in the action alone that we find the moral value.

To this some might say that plant and animal life is innocent, and cannot use reason to discover a moral truth. But this begs the questions: before reason can discover some moral truth, there must be a moral truth to discover, existing independently of the decisions of our reason. If this were the case then all the same relations would contain the same moral truths across all life - whether they were innocent or not - which is clearly not the case. 

So, morality cannot be a science, and neither can it be a matter of fact discovered by the understanding. "You never can find it, 'till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, toward this action." And this is the crux of Hume's whole moral philosophy; morals are objects of feeling rather than reason.

when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it

Vice and virtue are perceptions, just as sounds, colors, heat and cold are. Moreover, this is all that is needed to regulate our conduct, for "nothing could be more real...than our own sentiments of pleasure and uneasiness." Vice causes an uneasy sensation, virtue one of satisfaction.

I should note here again, from book II, that since vice and virtue are related either to ourselves or to others, they may be the cause of pride and humility in ourselves, or love and hatred in others.

Of justice and injustice

Not every virtue is natural; some produce their moral sentiments through a "contrivance", due to the circumstance and necessity of humanity. 

Humans have many needs to meet, but in themselves scarcely have the resources to meet them. Other animals are perfectly suited in this regard, but with a man, "to consider him only in himself, he is provided neither with arms, nor force, not other natural abilities, which are in any degree answerable to so many necessities." These defects are supplied through the development of society, which augments our power through combined forces, and increases our abilities through the partition of labour (we can develop a particular skill rather than try to become adequate in many). Children are raised to become a part of society "by rubbing off those rough corners and untoward affections, which prevent their coalition." We strive to dull their inclination towards greed and selfishness, for example.

In society there are many advantages, but these are limited and sometimes even scarce. What is to stop someone from taking the possessions of another family who has no connection or relation to him? As we saw in earlier books, our natural attachments are first to ourselves and our immediate family and relatives. We naturally seek to bring advantages to ourselves and our own, so it is not from nature that we are inhibited from doing this at the expense of others who bear us no relation. The remedy is through artifice. Recognizing that the "principle disturbance in society arises from those goods, which we call external", all members of society enter into a convention to put these goods on the same footing as our mental and bodily advantages. This is not the same as a promise, but is similar to two people in a rowboat: they do not promise to row in concert, but do so through a convention, which is for their mutual aid. It does not even need to be explicitly stated.

From this convention arises the ideas of justice and injustice, and property, rights, obligation.

This development is in everyone's interest. It is worth noting here that the interest we have in securing advantages for ourselves and those close to us is controlled by that very same interest! From this we can see that such a convention does not run contrary to our natural passions, but only restrains their "heedless and impetuous movement."

Yet, there is a natural aspect to justice: the whole thing is propped up by sympathy. With justice, "a sympathy with public interest is the source of moral approbation, which attends that virtue." If we observe someone robbing another, even if that person is a complete stranger, we feel a sense of uneasiness because we understand that this action is pernicious to society. Likewise, when we see neighbors treating each-other justly we feel satisfaction, again from sympathy with public interest.

More on justice and property

 I'm just going to quote the last paragraph of this section in its entirety:

Upon the whole, then, we are to consider this distinction betwixt justice and injustice, as having two different foundations, viz. that of interest, when men observe, that 'tis impossible to live in society without restraining themselves by certain rules; and that of morality, when this interest is once observ'd, and men receive a pleasure from the view of such actions as tend to the peace of society, and an uneasiness from such as are contrary to it. 'Tis the voluntary convention and artifice of men, which makes the first interest take place; and therefore those laws of justice are so far to be consider'd as artificial. After that interest is once establish'd and acknowledg'd, the sense of morality in the observance of these rules follows naturally, and of itself; tho' 'tis certain, that it is also augmented by a new artifice, and that the public instructions of politicians, and the private education of parents, contribute to the giving us a sense of honour and duty in the strict regulation of our actions with regard to the property of others.

Of natural virtues and vices

Now that I'm getting close to the end, I find myself rushing toward it. I found a good explanation of the natural virtues here:  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/#natvirtues

Some examples of natural virtues would be generosity, friendship, gratitude and things of that nature. These do not depend on any contrivance of people. Again, it is pain or pleasure - a peculiar kind of these which Hume calls "moral sentiments" - which causes us to perceive the vice or virtue, and again it is sympathy which explains our approval of it. In this case the sympathy is somewhat different, as it applies to each individual act of virtue as opposed to the general application of justice in society. When we see someone treat another with kindness we put ourselves in their shoes, so to speak, and we then feel what the recipient of the virtue is feeling - this naturally leads to our approval of it.

Acts of altruism

One thing that Hume doesn't really go into much detail about is altruism, or supposed selfless acts. I thought I'd try my hand at applying his system to this question.

First of all, I think it is fair to say that most people imaginatively place themselves in situations which demand altruistic actions before they ever have to actually perform those actions. If I am watching a news story about somebody who risked their life to save another I ask myself what I would do in that same situation. Of course, I always tell myself I would absolutely try to save the person - even the very thought of not doing it causes an uneasy feeling. This uneasiness, Hume would say, is humiliation or mortification.

For an example, imagine walking along a seaside beach and coming upon a child who is being pulled under by a strong current.

If I imagine just walking on by I feel a strong sense of mortification - even at the thought of it. What is the cause of this feeling? According to Hume, humiliation and pride are caused by some quality in an object that is related to the self. It could be some quality in our community, family, body, or mind to use just a few examples.

The cause of humility cannot, in the above scenario, be the relation between external objects. That is, it cannot be the relation between the drowning child and my walking by. A moose could walk on by, but nobody would feel a sense of moral indignation at that action; therefore the simple relationship between external objects here is not the cause of my humility. It is an internal relation. It is a relation between the drowning child and my virtue of courage (or lack of courage in this case.) Hume also notes that for something to be the cause of pride or humility it must be easily discernible by others as well as myself. So, it surely is the case that my humility is partly caused by the some concern for my reputation.

It is also true that when I imagine myself performing the action I am filled with pride. Heroes may play it cool on camera - "I just did what anyone would do" - but I am very sure that inside that are bursting with pleasure. Much of this pleasure is pride; pride in their courage, and pride in the esteem of others and their increased reputation. But also pleasure in love. Through sympathy they feel the gratitude and love of the one rescued, and these virtues would ensure that the feelings were mutual.

Any way you slice it, I think, the feelings we get from altruistic acts are deeply connected to the self, and far from being selfless in any sense. What is more, these acts are not entirely spontaneous, but are encouraged by our own resolution beforehand to not act in a way that will cause mortification or social exclusion. We are also encouraged by custom and education; through film and human interest news stories, for example. We know very well how we ought to act long before we have to act. 

Conclusion

The moral philosophy that Hume presents doesn't exactly line up with the standards many people set. It seems like it is a view of morals that is relative to our feelings, and therefore must be relative to place and time, as people living in ancient Sparta would not have felt any uneasiness about leaving a sickly newborn out on a mountaintop to die - so is that act then not immoral? I would say that yes, it is! What do we know of what people in Sparta felt within? What did the mother truly feel? What did the father truly feel? Did they feel uneasiness or remorse? Regardless of that, what is true is that today we feel many of the values of these ancient societies to be morally reprehensible. I feel confident in saying that, generally speaking, we have better morals today than many such societies - societies that failed, by the way, and did not reproduce or take hold - probably for good reason. But in talking about societies like this, we must be talking about social conventions and artificial virtues. As humanity has experimented with different conventions it has improved them and has found what works better for the stability and security of society; so again I have no problem with saying that we are more moral than past societies of slave-masters and child-killers, but I also realize that future societies will look at us and think the same thing with regards to some of our social practices.

I also submit that the natural virtues have always been virtues; that generosity and friendship have always been praised, and have always caused satisfaction and pleasant feelings. I do not think this could possibly ever change as long as humans are human.

Of course, Hume was writing in 1739, so I wouldn't go out on a limb for a second to say that he perfectly and completely accounts for morality. There are well over 200 years of advances in biology and psychology that can no doubt be used to improve his moral system. But I do think he was centered on the right track - not only in his moral philosophy, but in his whole philosophy in general - in placing human experience at the heart of all these questions.